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Abstract
Immigration is an important feature of many societies, and it has wide-
ranging effects on the education systems of host and source countries. There is
now a large empirical literature, but very little theoretical work on this topic.
We study a model of family immigration in a framework where school quality
and student outcomes are determined endogenously. We explain the selection
of immigrants in terms of parental motivation and discuss the selection effect
of different immigration policies. We provide novel evidence that is consistent
with one of our main theoretical results: for a given socioeconomic background
and skill level of parents, school performance of immigrant children in Spain
improves with parental immigration costs. We also provide a detailed analysis
of the effect of immigration on the different dimensions of the school system,
such as student effort, parental involvement, school incentives and resources
and how the endogenous response of the school system to immigration is in-
terrelated with both immigrants’ and natives’ educational choices.
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1 Introduction
Immigration is a prevalent feature of many societies. Given that immigration
involves families, the future of the host societies depends on how immigrant
children perform at school and how their presence affects the school system.1
Clearly, the school success of immigrant children has a direct impact on human
capital accumulation in the host country. But also, as immigrant children
are to be schooled, they change classroom composition and school resources.
Therefore, they might have a sizable (not necessarily negative) impact on
school quality and the performance of their native peers.2 The goal of this
paper is to clarify the effect of immigration on schooling through changes in
class composition, school resources and parental and teachers’ involvement in
the learning process.
Logically, the educational effect of immigration is a core concern of policy
makers and has attracted a massive research effort to understand this phe-
nomenon.3 Most of this effort is empirical and there is relatively little theoret-
ical work to contextualize the many recent findings in the literature, to clarify
the main mechanism at work and to inform future empirical investigations.
In this paper, we develop a framework to study the theoretical links between
1To grasp the importance of immigrant children, according to the US Census Bureau,
34% of all youth aged 15-19 in 2000 were from minority groups and one in five school-
age children live in immigrant families (Kao and Thompson, 2003). The Innocenti Research
Center reports that almost a quarter of children were immigrants in 2009 in the Netherlands,
Germany, Sweden and the United States. This proportion is about one-sixth in France and
Great Britain (Alba, Sloan, and Sperling, 2011).
2Similarly, immigration may affect class composition and school resources in the source
country when migrants take their children with them.
3Studies like those conducted by PISA, and other international organizations (like TIMSS
or PIRLS), have allowed for the empirical analysis of immigrant educational success and the
externalities imposed on natives. In many countries, a large fraction of immigrant children
face substantial disadvantages in reaching educational parity with native children (Heath,
Rothon, and Kilpi, 2008; Anghel and Cabrales, 2014). Australia and Canada are the big
exceptions where immigrants often outperform natives before controlling for individual char-
acteristics (Schnepf, 2004). It is also not at all rare for some immigrant students to be top of
the class (see Card (2005), Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010) and Dustmann, Frattini,
and Theodoropoulos (2010)). Dustmann and Glitz (2010) has an overview on migration
and education. Researchers by now agree that immigrant students perform differently by
origin group (Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp, 2008) and (Levels and Dronkers, 2008) and
cross-nationally (Marks, 2005). Even immigrants from the same origin perform differently
according to their destination country (Bertoli, Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega,
2013, 2011). Moreover, the immigration mix differs considerably across countries, which is
only partially due to colonial links (Alba, Sloan, and Sperling (2011), based on Kirszbaum,
Brinbaum, and Simon (2009)).
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immigration and schooling and, within the confines of this unified framework,
we explain different facts uncovered by the empirical literature and our own
work.
In any theory connecting immigration with schooling, student outcomes
must be determined endogenously as a result of the interplay between different
families (immigrants and natives) and the school system. In our model, parents
(immigrants and native) not only differ in their wages (reflecting different
talent or skills), but also in “(parental) motivation”; a term we use to refer
to parents’ concerns about their children’s education achievement. Thus, the
schooling effects of immigration must be mediated by parents’ characteristics,
reflected in their wages and parental motivation. We show how introducing this
dimension into a theory of education and migration choices help us understand
the empirical relationship established between immigration costs and student
performance, as well as many other important facts already uncovered by the
literature.
Within our framework, we address two different but related research ques-
tions. We explain the selection of immigrants in terms of parental motivation
and discuss how different types of immigrants are selected according to dif-
ferent immigration policies. We also study the effect of immigration on the
different dimensions of the school system, such as student effort, parental in-
volvement, school incentives and resources and how the endogenous response
of the school system to immigration is interrelated with both immigrants’ and
natives’ educational choices.
In our framework, children are short-sighted and need to be motivated to
study. Parents divide their time between working and motivating their chil-
dren, and they decide whether or not to emigrate. Schools provide additional
motivational schemes to enhance children’s learning effort. The effect of these
schemes depends on school resources, which are determined by the education
policy. The contribution of this framework is to emphasize that learning is
a process involving the interaction among children, parents, schools and the
decision of school resources. Thus, attainment and school quality are endoge-
nously determined by classroom composition, which is itself affected directly
by immigration.
We show that the educational effect of immigration crucially depends on
immigrant parental motivation. We first establish why immigration receiving
countries would like to attract immigrants with a high parental motivation.
First, we obtain the obvious but reassuring result according to which chil-
dren’s learning effort increases in parental motivation; hence highly motivated
immigrant parents are more likely to have skilled children thereby positively
contributing to the future human capital of their host country. But we also
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obtain a subtler result between school quality and immigration: when school
quality is sufficiently high, as it is usually the case of host countries, school
involvement increases in parental motivation. In other words, the endogenous
school quality improves with higher parental motivation.
By embedding our theory of education into a model of immigration de-
cisions, we identify conditions under which migration is selected by parents
with higher parental motivation. These conditions involve a sufficiently high
expected absolute skill premium for the immigrant children relative to the
parental wage gain from immigration and sufficiently strong education incen-
tives at the host country. Meeting these conditions implies a positive selection
in terms of parental motivation within different skill levels.4 The empirical
observable implication of this result is that, under the conditions for posi-
tive selection, student performance of immigrant children should be better
the higher the costs associated with migrating from the source country. In
the empirical appendix of this paper, we discuss original empirical evidence
consistent with this result. More specifically, we exploit the standardized eval-
uation of the universe of students at the region of Madrid (Spain) and show
that immigrant children in the Madrid region perform better if their parents
faced higher emigration costs. Importantly, this result is robust to controls for
different family and country of origin characteristics. That is, the positive as-
sociation between immigration costs and school performance cannot be easily
explained by pure selection of immigrations in skills or education levels.
Another implication of our result on motivation-based selection is that the
performance of immigrants at school from the same origin country varies across
destinations. Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara (2012) find that Turkish immi-
grants outperform those of the same cohort who stayed in Turkey. This differ-
ence in educational achievement between migrants and non-migrants from the
same country persists even after controlling for family education background
and socioeconomic characteristics. Although consistent with our model, this
result may reflect a higher quality of the school system at the host countries.
In fact, Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara (2012) consider Austria, Germany,
Switzerland and Denmark; destination countries which perform similarly in
4Notice that our notion of positive immigrant selection is very different from the typical
notion of positive immigrant selection in terms of skills in the immigration literature as
analyzed for example by Borjas (1987, 1999). In this literature the skill premium is also
important: Grogger and Hanson (2011) account for positive selection in terms of skills
associated with the absolute difference in earnings of skilled workers at the host and source
country. But the only skill premium that matters in this literature would be our parental
skill premium. In our model selection is in terms of parental motivation and the expected
skill premium of the children is crucial.
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reading and maths at the PISA assessment but with scores considerably higher
than those obtained by Turkey. However, Turkish emigrants in Switzerland
and Denmark outperform those who migrated to Germany and Austria despite
the relatively similar levels of the school quality in these countries. Again, this
result is not explained by differences in education levels of parents and socioe-
conomic characteristics.5 Our model can explain this fact as costs of migrating
to Switzerland and Denmark are arguably higher than those associated with
Germany and Austria; where the Turkish community is large and strong.6
Next, we turn to a more nuanced analysis of the effect of immigration on
the school system. Of course, more (less) motivated immigrant parents would
involve more positive (negative) effects on the host country school system, but
these effects are mediated by the characteristics of both the native parents
and the pre-immigration school system. We show, for example, that, although
a negative selection of immigrant parents reduces the school effort of native
students, this particularly hits native students with relatively low parental
motivation; a result that has been uncovered as a regularity in many empir-
ical studies (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman, 2004). We also show that positive
selection in parental motivation might not have a positive effect on the school
quality if immigration mainly involves low skilled workers. In this case, high
parental involvement of immigrant parents will crowd out school involvement
and negatively hit native students.
We also look at the effect of immigration on school resources in a world
where public schools are financed by parents through taxes. We assume that
the policy maker maximizes the utility of the median voter parent, and show
that school resources increase in immigrant parental motivation. Hence, a neg-
ative selection in parental motivation hits the native students directly through
the reaction of teachers and indirectly through a reduction in school resources
by the policy maker. Evidence of immigration reducing public education ex-
penditures in Europe is provided by Speciale (2012). Therefore, immigration
also affects schooling through the responses of the education policy, not only
by the presence of immigrants themselves.
This paper is related to a recent literature that focuses on how the ef-
fect of different education policies depends on the behavioral responses of the
different actors involved in the education process. For example, Pop-Eleches
and Urquiola (2013) find a positive effect of school quality on student scores
for the case of Rumanian high schools. Furthermore, they show as well that
5The evidence provided by Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara (2012) suggests that there
has to be a within skill attribute.
6Our analysis also shows how the exogenous quality of the school system influences
immigrant selection in terms of parental motivation.
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parental effort and quality-improving school activities substitute with each
other, as in our model.7 Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) and De Fraja,
Oliveira, and Zanchi (2010) provide empirical evidence on the positive impact
of parental and student effort on educational achievement. De Fraja, Oliveira,
and Zanchi (2010) also find that school motivational activities are positively
associated with student scores.8 Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011) ra-
tionalize all these empirical findings in a model that connects the effect of
education policy on student outcomes with the behavioral responses of stu-
dents, teachers, parents and education authorities to policy-driven changes in
classroom composition. Our model retains this element but focuses on the
endogenous determination of immigration selection and its effects on native
students and school quality.
Our work contributes to an incipient theoretical literature focusing on how
immigration affects the education system at the host country. In a recent pa-
per, Dottori, Estevan, and Shen (2013) show that if the immigrant population
has low skills, there is a push for high-skilled natives to segregate into private
schools. This, in turn, makes them less keen to finance of public education,
which entails a negative shock on the welfare of less-skilled natives. Farre,
Ortega, and Tanaka (2011) establish similar results in a calibrated model for
the Spanish education system. In particular, they find that the increase of the
immigrant population led to a large reduction of about 11 percent in public
spending per student.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model of parental motivation and the school system. In section 3, we study
immigrant selection and discuss under which circumstances higher emigration
costs can improve parental selection. Appendix A provides evidence of a pos-
itive relationship between immigration costs and immigrant children school
performance. Section 4 studies the implications of the model for the school
performance of natives and immigrants. Section 5 examines how these impli-
cations differ according to the skill composition of immigrant parents. Section
6 looks at the implications of immigration for school resources. Section 7
discusses some immigration policy implications and concludes.
7Additional evidence of the substitution between parental effort and school resources is
provided by Houtenville and Smith Conway (2008)
8Sahin (2004) provides another example of how parent and student responses affect the
impact of education policies for the case of higher education tuition subsidies. Evidence of
the interaction between parents and the school system mediated by monitoring of schools
is offered by Liang and Ferreyra (2011).
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2 Parental motivation and the school system
In this section, we develop the basic model of the school system. To fix ideas,
we focus on the host country, although our analysis extends straightforwardly
to the case of the source country. As in Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales
(2011), our school system results from the interaction of students (children,
who need incentives to put effort on learning), parents (who work and set
up costly incentives schemes for students), and teachers/headmasters (who
decide on the incentive scheme provided at schools). We also assume that
every parent has one child. We now describe our different actors in detail.
The students’ utility function:
The students are children who perceive learning as costly, because they
would rather play, and do not internalize the future benefits of studying to-
day. As a consequence, they need to be motivated to exert learning effort. The
incentive scheme is put into place by parents and the school. Let cpi be the
strength of parental involvement for every unit of child’s effort ei.
9 Similarly,
cT refers to the strength of the school /teacher’s involvement.
10 As suggested
by empirical evidence (Houtenville and Smith Conway, 2008; Pop-Eleches and
Urquiola, 2013), we assume that parents and school involvements are substi-
tutes.11 We assume that both parental and school involvement enter positively
into the children’s short-term utility which is given by:
U ci = (cpi + cT ) ei −
1
2
e2i , (1)
where 1
2
e2i is the cost of learning.
12
The parents’ utility function:
9Parental involvement includes activities at home like supervising children, explicit help
with the homework, discussing school issues and providing reward schemes as well as school
based activities like volunteering at school, attending school functions etc (Hoover-Dempsey
and Sandler (1997)).
10Schools organize motivational schemes and special outings (e.g. school trips, theatre
and museum visits) and set learning goals choosing reward schemes.
11No qualitative change ensues if we assume the incentives to be complementary. This is
because the substitutability at the children’s utility level is mitigated by complementarities
elsewhere. Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011) discuss this issue in depth.
12Instead of using positive reinforcement for learning efforts parents and schools could also
work with punishment when children do not study. It is not difficult to see that negative
reinforcement induces the same behavior in children than the positive reinforcement we
model here.
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Unlike children, parents understand the long-term consequences of their
children’s choices today, namely how the child’s learning effort when young
influences the child labor market prospects in the future. In particular, the
probability that the child will work in a high-skilled job equals the child’s
learning effort ei, while the child will become an unskilled worker with proba-
bility (1− ei). Wages at skilled jobs and unskilled jobs are denoted by ws and
wu respectively.
13 Hence a child’s future labor market prospect is given by
wci = w
c
sei + (1− ei)wcu. (2)
Parents differ in their parental motivation14 which is modeled as the weight
θi a parent gives to her child’s labor market prospect in her utility function.
15
Parents also value their own welfare W Pi . Hence parental utility is given by
UPi = θiw
c
i +W
P
i .
A parent has to split her total time T between working and setting up and
executing an incentive plan for her child. The time to generate the reward is
given by cpiei/2, while the cost of generating incentives for their child is the
foregone parental wage wp.16 Hence, the parental utility function is given by
the expression
UPi = θi (w
c
sei + (1− ei)wcu) +
(
T − 1
2
cpiei
)
wp. (3)
The school’s utility function:
Schools/teachers also fully understand and care about the future job per-
spectives of their students, assigning weight θT to the average student’s suc-
cess. The teachers have to decide how much of the time TT that remains
13These wages can differ across countries as well as between natives and immigrants.
14Heterogeneity in parental motivation is one of the major differences of the present model
to Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011).
15Empirically, parental motivation is likely to be positively correlated with parental work
ethic. Although this link is not captured in the present model, it is easy to extend the model
to incorporate work ethic by letting parents allocate their time between leisure, education
and work and assuming that the same parameter affects the weight given to education and
inversely the enjoyment of leisure. This specification was used in a former version of the
model leading to qualitatively similar results.
16Our model could be modified to incorporate parental talent vPi . On the one hand,
parental talent vPi increases wages w
P
i = v
PφPi where φ
P
i refers to the parental baseline
wage rate. On the other hand parental talent decreases the time parents need to spend for
generating their child’s incentive reward. This time is now given by cpiei/2v
P
i . Introducing
talent into our model would only complicate the exposition but would not affect the main
results.
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after teaching their compulsory hours they will use to motivate their students
(such as training or preparing learning activities), and how much they will
use for outside job opportunities (such as private tutoring) which are paid at
wage rate wT . The teacher’s time spent generating the reward cT is equal to
1
N
∑N
i=1
1
2
cT ei where N is the total number of children in the classroom. The
school/teacher’s utility function is therefore
UT =
θT
N
N∑
i=1
(wcsei + (1− ei)wcu) +
(
TT − 1
2N
N∑
i=1
cT ei
)
wT . (4)
Let N = NI +NN where NI is the number of immigrant children and NN the
number of native children. We can rewrite the school’s utility function as
UT =
θT
N
(
(wcs − wcu)
(
NN∑
k=1
ek +
NI∑
i=l
el
)
+ wcuN
)
+
(
TT − cT
2N
(
NN∑
k=1
ek +
NI∑
l=1
el
))
wT . (5)
The structure of the game: The school system is modeled as a two-
stage game. In the first stage, parents and schools simultaneously decide and
announce the optimal strength of their educational involvement in each unit of
child’s effort: cpi and cT respectively.
17 After observing these announcements,
children decide their optimal effort ei.
Equilibrium: We solve the game by backward induction.
In the second stage children choose their optimal effort ei by maximizing
their utility function (1) taking parental incentives cpi and school incentives
cT as given. This leads to the following optimal effort decision by the children
ei = cpi + cT . (6)
In words, children’s effort is simply the sum of parental and school edu-
cational involvement. We can now turn to the first-stage of the game where
we need to substitute this expression (6) into the parent’s utility (3) and
the school’s utility (5). Taking the optimal effort decision of children (6) into
account, the teacher’s problem is to choose the level of cT that maximizes
17In order to ensure a interior solution, we impose motivation rewards to be positive as
to avoid corner solutions where cpi and cT may be zero.
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UT =
θT
N
(
(wcs − wcu)
(
NN∑
k=1
(cpk + cT ) +
NI∑
l=1
(cpl + cT )
)
+ wcuN
)
+
(
TT − cT
2N
(
NN∑
k=1
(cpk + cT ) +
NI∑
l=1
(cpl + cT )
))
wT .
leading to the optimal school involvement/incentives
cT =
θT
wT
(wcs − wcu)−
NNcNp +NIc
I
p
2N
, (7)
where
cNp =
1
NN
NN∑
k=1
cNpk , c
I
p =
1
NI
NI∑
l=1
cIpl .
The strength of the school involvement depends on the average parental in-
volvement of both natives and immigrants, to which we turn now. Parents
choose their incentive scheme cpi to maximize
UPi = θi (w
c
s (cpi + cT ) + (1− (cpi + cT ))wcu) +
(
T − 1
2
(cpi + cT ) cpi
)
wp.
leading to the optimal parental choice
cpi = (w
c
s − wcu)
θi
wp
− 1
2
cT . (8)
We define relative parental concern ψi as the ratio of parental motivation
to their wage
ψi =
θi
wp
. (9)
Also, we define the average relative parental concern among the native
and foreign population as
Ωk =
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
θi
wpi
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
ψi for k = N, I. (10)
Using this notation, we can now derive the interior solution of the game.
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Lemma 1 For a given school the optimal strength of parental and school in-
volvement are
cjpl = max
[
0, (wcs − wcu)
(
ψjl −
2
3
θT
wT
+
NIΩI +NNΩN
3(NN +NI)
)]
(11)
cT = max
[
0,
2
3
(wcs − wcu)
(
2θT
wT
− NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)]
. (12)
where j = N refers to natives and j = I to immigrants.
If both the schools and the child’s parent l choose a positive strength of
involvement the corresponding child i′s effort is
eji = (w
c
s − wcu)
(
ψjl +
2
3
θT
wT
− NIΩI +NNΩN
3(NN +NI)
)
for j = N, I (13)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The above expressions indicate that school and parental involvement are
substitutes. Both involvements are driven by the potential gains from educa-
tion captured by (wcs − wcu). School involvement increase in school motivation
θT and decrease in teacher’s outside job opportunities wT and in average rel-
ative parental concern since NIΩI+NNΩN
(NN+NI)
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 ψi. The higher this aver-
age, which implies the more parents care on average for education, the higher
parental involvement in their child’s education.
An interior solution (i.e. a solution with 0 < eji < 1) exists where both
the parents and the school choose positive strengths of learning involvement
for some conditions on the distribution of ψjl . Specifically, positive strengths
require ψjl +
NIΩI+NNΩN
3(NN+NI)
> 2
3
θT
wT
> NIΩI+NNΩN
3(NN+NI)
which is a relationship comparing
parental motivation and their wages with school motivation and wages for
outside job opportunities for teachers. Observe that θ
T
wT
can be interpreted as
a measure of school quality and we will refer to it as net/relative school
concern. Hence the condition for positive incentives can be interpreted as a
relationship between school quality measured by the relative school concern
and individual and average parental quality measured by the relative individual
parental concern and relative average parental concern respectively.
Until now, we have allowed parental concerns to be unrelated to school
concerns. However, it is realistic to assume that parental motivation positively
reinforces school motivation. This corresponds to situations where teachers’
incentives are encouraged by interacting with highly motivated parents. It is
demoralizing for teachers to deal with disinterested parents or, more generally,
with student apathy. To capture this link formally, we postulate:
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Assumption 1 θT depends on the average parental motivation. That is,
θT = kθ =
k
N
N∑
i=1
θi, (14)
where N is the number of parents affecting the education of a particular school
class of children and k indicates the exogenous weight that the school assigns
to the future wages of their students.
We are now in a position to analyze how parental motivation in general and
immigrants’ parental motivation in particular affect the quality of the school
system.
Using assumption 1 in equation (12), we can express the optimal strength
of school involvement as:
cT = max
[
0,
2 (wcs − wcu)
3N
N∑
i=1
((
2k
wT
− 1
wpi
)
θi
)]
, (15)
Hence, schools will only choose a positive strength of involvement if
N∑
i=1
(
2k
wT
− 1
wpi
)
θi > 0. (16)
In words, parental involvement will not crowd out school involvement if the
relative school concern is at least half the size of the average relative parental
concern. Schools must care sufficiently about their students’ performance.
Moreover,
Proposition 1 School involvement cT increases in parental concern θi if and
only if wp > w
T
2k
.
Proof. To see how positive school involvement changes with parental moti-
vation we need to look at
sign
∂cT
∂θi
= sign
(
2k
wT
− 1
wpi
)
,
which tells us that school involvement (15) increases in parental motivation
for parents whose wages are such that 2k/wT > 1/wpi
The ratio k
wT
is the exogenous term determining the net school concern
θT
wT
= k
wT
θ and can therefore be interpreted as the exogenously given school
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quality. It is also (proportional to) the marginal effect of parental motivation
of parent i on the net school concern while the marginal effect on average
relative parent concern is (proportional to) 1
wpi
. The condition of Proposition
1 relates parental wage, namely the opportunity cost of parental involvement,
to the inverse of exogenous school quality which is the ratio of the school’s
opportunity cost of teacher’s involvement to the weight schools give to the
future performance of their students. A higher parental concern will increase
parental involvement but this increase might affect school involvement neg-
atively since parental and school involvement are substitutes. A sufficiently
high exogenous school quality make school involvement more valuable and al-
lows for both parental and school involvement to increase in parental concern.
Therefore the lower bound on parental wage for school involvement to increase
in parental concern is proportional to the inverse of exogenous school quality.
Assumption 1 allows us to characterize how a child’s learning effort depends
on parental motivation, namely
ei = (w
c
s − wcu)
(
θi
wpi
+
1
3N
N∑
i=1
(
2k
wT
− 1
wpi
)
θi
)
, (17)
From this equation it is straightforward to establish:
Proposition 2 Children’s learning effort is always increasing in parental mo-
tivation θi.
Proof. This follows from ∂ei
∂θi
> 0
Propositions 1 and 2 reveal the crucial role of parental concern/motivation.
On the one hand, more motivated parents produce children with higher learn-
ing efforts. On the other hand, if schools have a sufficiently high exogenous
quality, more motivated parents have a positive spillover on the entire system
by leading to a higher school involvement cT . Therefore, immigration receiving
countries would like to attract immigrants with a high parental concern.
3 Immigrant self-selection
In this section, we study the immigration decision. There are two countries:
Home (H), the source or origin country, and Abroad (A), the destination or
host country. Each parent i in country H faces a fixed cost of immigration
Fi. The variable Fi follows the distribution F (.) in a large compact interval.
Immigration policies may affect this distribution in various ways and we clarify
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their impact in terms of whether they induce immigration to have a positive
impact on the school system.
Both countries have a skilled and unskilled labor market and their schools
system can be described by the model of the previous section.18 However,
they may differ in the economic opportunities and the quality of the school
system. Based on these parameters, parents estimate the expected utilities
of both staying and leaving their country of origin. Immigration requires the
utility difference to be higher than the immigration cost.
Let U jPi denote parental utility when living within country j, namely
U jPi = θi
(
eji
(
wcsj − wcuj
)
+ wcuj
)
− 1
2
cjpie
j
iw
pi
j + Tw
pi
j for j = H,A (18)
Using the optimal involvement and effort decisions derived in Lemma 1, the
parental utility after some simplification becomes
U jPi = Tw
pi
j + θiw
c
uj
+
wpij
2
(
ej
∗
i
)2
for j = H,A (19)
where ej
∗
i is the optimal learning effort of i
′s child when schooled in country j
which by (13) is
ej
∗
i =
(
wcsj − wcuj
)(
ψjl +
2
3
θTj
wTj
− Ωj
3
)
for j = H,A
where Ωj =
1
Nj
∑Nj
k=1 ψ
j
k is the average relative parental concern in a school in
country j. We can therefore write parental utility as
U jPi = Tw
pi
j + θiw
c
uj
(20)
+
(
wcsj − wcuj
)2
2
 θ2i
wpij
+ 2θi
(
2
3
θTj
wTj
− Ωj
3
)
+ wpij
(
2
3
θTj
wTj
− Ωj
3
)2
Observe that the first term of parental utility Twpij corresponds to the max-
imum earnings from working (what a parent can get by working all the time),
while the second term θiw
c
uj
reflects the parental utility if the child does not
make any educational effort. Parental involvement in the child’s education
18We are implicitly assuming that how learning incentives translate into the probability of
getting a skilled job in the country in which education was received is the same across coun-
tries. The crucial element in our analysis is that learning effort is endogenously determined
according to different country characteristics.
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increases the parental utility whenever future skilled jobs are better paid than
future unskilled jobs; that is if wcsj > w
c
uj
as is reflected in the third term of
(20).
A parent i will emigrate from country H to country A if UAPi − Fi > UHPi .
From (20) it follows that
Lemma 2 UAPi − Fi > UHPi if and only if
T (wpiA − wpiH) + θi
(
wcuA − wcuH
)
(21)
+
θ2i
2
((
wcsA − wcuA
)2
wpiA
−
(
wcsH − wcuH
)2
wpiH
)
+θi
((
wcsA − wcuA
)2(2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA
3
)
− (wcsH − wcuH)2(23 θTHwTH − ΩH3
))
+
1
2
(
wpiA
(
2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA
3
)2 (
wcsA − wcuA
)2 − wpiH (23 θTHwTH − ΩH3
)2 (
wcsH − wcuH
)2)
> Fi.
Since the primary motive for emigration is the possibility of better economic
opportunities, we assume that wages abroad are at least as high as wages at
home and one of the three wage parameters (expected parental wage wPi ,
expected child’s wage if skilled wcs and if unskilled w
c
u) must be strictly higher.
Then we can interpret the condition for immigration in Lemma 2 as follows:
T (wpiA − wpiH) + θi
(
wcuA − wcuH
)
describes the wage gain due to immigration if
the immigrant parent dedicates all the time to work. The parent might get a
higher expected pay wPiA ≥ wPiH and the unskilled child might also earn more
money wcuA ≥ wcuHwhich is weighted by the parental concern parameter θi.
The remaining 3 lines of the sum describe the change in parental utility from
emigrating that is achieved by incentivizing the child at school and can be
rewritten as
w
pi
A
2
e2A − w
pi
H
2
e2H (see equation (19)). Parents and schools want to
incentivize children to increase their chance to get a high-skilled job, which is
why the absolute difference between skilled and unskilled wages enters in the
three parts of the sum that corresponds to the parental utility derived from
the child’s effort. Since the parental wage is the opportunity cost of parental
involvement in incentivizing the child, a higher wage has a negative effect on
effort as captured by wpi dividing in the second line of the sum. However, since
school involvement and parental involvement are substitutes a higher wpi has
an indirect effect by increasing effort that is captured by the final line of the
sum. The third term of the sum captures the change in parental utility due
to a change in school quality combined with the incentives for education.
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Suppose the heterogeneity is such that the vector of variables
ξi ≡ (θi, wpiA , wpiH) ∈ Ξ,
characterizes each individual belongs to a finite set of types Ξ. At the same
time the variable Fi follows the distribution F (.) in the compact interval
[0,A] , where we assume A > maxξi∈Ξ UPi . Note that according to equation
(21) if an individual with type ξi and value for the cost of moving Fi wants to
move, another individual with type ξj = ξi and Fj < Fi also wants to move.
Hence, the equilibrium can be characterized by a set of thresholds. For each
type ξ ∈ Ξ there is some Fξ such that for all i with ξi = ξ ∈ Ξ the individual
moves to A if and only if Fi < Fξ. Thus,
Proposition 3 An equilibrium in immigration decisions always exists.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Understanding the effects of differences in parental motivation on the host
and source countries requires further clarification about how individuals from
H self-select into the migrant population. We turn to this question in the
following subsections.
3.1 When immigration does select the most motivated
parents
We aim at identifying the conditions under which the most motivated parents
from a source country are those who self-select into immigration. As migrating
is an individual decision, potential immigrants take ΩA and ΩH as given. This
is the same as assuming:
∂ΩA
∂θξ
=
∂ΩH
∂θξ
= 0
Using the link of school motivation to parental motivation stipulated in
assumption 1 and the condition for immigration stated in Lemma 2, we obtain
the following crucial result:
Proposition 4 Assume that wages in the host country are at least as high as
wages in the source country. Then, for any skill level, immigrant selection is
positive in parental motivation if the following conditions are satisfied:
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1. Absolute Skill Premium:(
wcsA − wcuA
)(
wcsH − wcuH
) >√wpiA
wpiH
(22)
2. External Education Incentives:
wcuA +
1
3
(
wcsA − wcuA
)2(2kA
wTA
θA − ΩA
)
≥ wcuH +
1
3
(
wcsH − wcuH
)2(2kH
wTH
θH − ΩH
)
(23)
Proof. It follows from inspection of equation 21. See Appendix B.3 for the
details.
The ratio of absolute skill premia for children between the receiving and
sending countries has to be higher than the (square root of) ratio of parental
wages in sending and receiving countries (the gain from immigration).19 This
condition places an upper bound on parental wages abroad, which nicely
captures the trade-off parents face when incentivizing their children: forgo
parental wage versus higher expected wages for their children. A sufficiently
high absolute skill premium for children guarantees that parents incentivize
their children more abroad than at home. But this is not sufficient for positive
parental selection. The external environment at the host country has to be suf-
ficiently favorable. To see this, notice that condition (23) can be reformulated
as:
wcuA +
1
2
(
wcsA − wcuA
)
cA
∗
T ≥ wcuH +
1
2
(
wcsH − wcuH
)
cH
∗
T (24)
Thus, we can interpret education incentives as a measure of the expected
wage increase for a skilled child weighted by the education incentives provided
by the school. This measure has to be higher at the host country. It is
instructive to consider a situation in which both countries are identical except
for their wage structure. More technically,
Corollary 1 If the host and the source countries have the same exogenous
quality of the school system (2kA/w
T
A = 2kH/w
T
H); the same initial distribution
19Notice that this condition can be satisfied even if the relative skill premium is lower in
the host country. We are interested in the future human capital of children and therefore in
parental selection, for which the absolute skill premium for children matters more. Grogger
and Hanson (2011) document the importance of the absolute skill premium for parents to
explain immigrant selection in parental education.
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of parental motivation; the same distribution of parental motivation among skill
groups; and the same proportion of people in skilled employment, then a higher
absolute skill premium at the host country is sufficient for inequality (23) to
hold.
Proof. Notice that due to the equality in exogenous school quality(
2kA
wTA
θN − ΩA
)
>
(
2kH
wTH
θH − ΩH
)
⇔ ΩA ≤ ΩH ,
or equivalently
1
NH
∑
θi/w
pi
H ≥
1
NA
∑
θj/w
pi
A .
This is true since wages in country A are at least as high as wages in country
H, and the distribution of parental motivation among skill groups is identical.
Obviously, if the exogenous school quality is better abroad than at home so
that 2kA/w
T
A > 2kH/w
T
H , condition (23) is relaxed. This result suggests that
immigration is more likely to positively select motivated parents when the
host country pays a higher future absolute skill premium and school quality is
better, provided that intrinsic parental motivation is not much higher in the
source country. Arguably, this describes a situation where immigrants arrive
to highly developed countries from developing countries.
Proposition 4 sheds light on how immigration policies that affect immigra-
tion costs for all immigrants influence the selection of immigrants and conse-
quently the educational performance of immigrant children, which is increasing
in parental motivation. Notice that conditions (22) and (23) being satisfied
characterize a situation where highly motivated parents enjoy relatively higher
benefits from emigrating. As a consequence, selection improves with higher
emigration costs.
Proposition 5 For a given host country, immigrant children who perform
better are those whose parents faced the higher emigration costs
In Appendix A, we provide empirical support to this result. More precisely,
we present novel empirical evidence according to which immigrant performance
in the standardized exams for all primary schools in the Madrid region do
indeed improve with emigration costs. Proposition 4 also implies the flip-side
of the argument:
Proposition 6 For a given origin country, immigrant children perform better
in host countries for which the emigration costs are higher.
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An interesting case consistent with this result is provided by Dustmann,
Frattini, and Lanzara (2012), who show that Turkish immigrant children not
only outperform kids staying in Turkey but also their student achievement
varies across four countries with relatively similar education quality: Ger-
many, Austria, Switzerland and Denmark. According to Dustmann, Frat-
tini, and Lanzara (2012) Turkish immigrant children do considerably better in
Switzerland and Denmark compared to similar Turkish immigrant children in
Germany and Austria - conditional and unconditional on parental background
characteristics and the quality of schools they attend. Given than migration
costs from Turkey are arguably higher for Switzerland and Denmark than for
Germany and Austria, this corollary provides an explanation to this fact.20
Our theory can also guide us when the conditions of proposition 4 fail and
immigration no longer selects the most motivated parents.
3.2 When immigration does not select the most moti-
vated parents
In this section, we briefly discuss the cases where the conditions for a positive
selection of immigration in terms of parental motivation no longer hold. In
these cases, migrants are not among those who are more motivated and thus
the effect of immigration on the school system will be negative.
When both condition (22) and condition (23) are violated, both the parental
trade-off, and the external education incentives are worse abroad than at home.
This typically happens because the benefits from education abroad (the abso-
lute skill premium) are lower than at home. Hence the incentives to educate
children are weaker. Moreover, unskilled wages abroad cannot be much higher
than at home. For this reason, parents with higher parental concerns would
not migrate and immigrant selection would likely fall on the least motivated
parents.
When condition (22) is violated but (23) is satisfied, parental selection is
likely to fall on intermediate levels of parental motivation. On the one hand
the tension between parental wages abroad and the child’s future wages is
resolved in such a way that parents work more hours and incentivize their
children less, which is a loss for motivated parents. On the other hand, the
external environment children face abroad is more favorable, which is a gain
20The size of the Turkish community in Germany and Austria provides a reason why the
migration costs from Turkey might be lower in these countries. Language distance between
Danish and Turkish and relatively more strict immigration laws in Switzerland provide
additional reasons.
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for motivated parents. These two countervailing forces are likely to prevent
the most motivated and the least motivated parents from emigrating.
When condition (22) is satisfied but (23) is violated, then parents set higher
education incentives abroad than at home, but the external environment for
children is worse abroad. The benefits of immigration (which are a quadratic
function of θ) first fall in parental motivation till they reach a minimum and
then raise again. Hence, parents willing to emigrate, are likely to fall into the
extreme ends of the distribution of parental motivation. Observe, that this case
only happens rarely. To see this, recall that wcuA > w
c
uH
by assumption, hence(
wcsA − wcuA
)
>
(
wcsH − wcuH
)
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
condition (22) to hold. This implies that the returns to education are higher
abroad, which positively affect both parental incentives and school incentives.
Therefore condition (23) can only be violated if external school quality and
average parental motivation at home is much higher than abroad, and unskilled
wages are very similar. But in this case also the last line of the condition to
emigrate given by (21) will become negative and even very low Fi might not
be sufficient to induce emigration.21
The empirical implications of the model can change considerably if we look
at host and origin countries where condition (22) is violated. This happens for
example if it is mainly the unskilled jobs that are better paid in the destination
country than in the origin country. If condition (23) is also violated, it makes
sense for the destination country to adopt policies that reduce immigration
costs in order to be able to attract also immigrants with a high parental mo-
tivation, irrespectively of their level of skills. An example of this situation is
given by the immigrants hosted in Argentina from countries like Bolivia, Peru
or Paraguay (Gasparini, Cruces, and Tornarolli, 2009). These origin coun-
tries are characterized by a very high differences between skilled and unskilled
wages, certainly as high as in Argentina. Also, the wages in Argentina are
not that much higher. This gives some theoretical support to the immigra-
tion strategy of Argentina, which has one of the most lenient immigration
regulations in the world (Albarrac´ın, 2004).
If (23) holds, selection falls on the intermediate range of parental motiva-
tion. In this case whether it is good for a country to adopt policies that reduce
or increase immigration costs depends on the exact distribution of θ. Under
intermediate selection a decline in immigration costs will expand the interval
of values of θ for which emigration occurs at both extremes which can influ-
ence in either direction the immigrants’ average level of θ. More specifically,
21Observe that at least for low-skill immigrants, the main economic motive for immigration
reflected by the value of T (wpiA − wpiH ) will also be very low.
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if θ follows a non-increasing density function, then a reduction in immigration
costs induces a decline in the average level of θ (McKenzie and Rapoport,
2010)
The above results indicate that immigration policies should be specific
to the country of origin. For origin countries where both the condition on
the absolute skill premium (22) and the condition on the external education
incentives (23) are satisfied, imposing additional costs will improve immigrant
selection in parental motivation. Otherwise, lowering immigration costs but
setting strict and low quotas might be the better policy.
3.3 School quality
In the previous section, incentives to immigrate where both shaped by the
economic incentives and possibly the difference in school systems. It will be
useful to understand the effect of differences in school quality in isolation. In
order to do so, we assume that school quality is the only difference between
H (Home) and A (Abroad), and that school quality is better abroad, i.e.(
2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA
3
)
>
(
2
3
θTH
wTH
− ΩH
3
)
. Under these assumptions immigration occurs if
(21) holds which reduces to
θi (w
c
s − wcu)2
((
2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA
3
)
−
(
2
3
θTH
wTH
− ΩH
3
))
(25)
+
1
2
(wcs − wcu)2wpi
((
2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA
3
)2
−
(
2
3
θTH
wTH
− ΩH
3
)2)
> Fi.
which after some examination implies:
Proposition 7 The cost that a parent is willing to pay to immigrate increases
in school quality, but it increases proportionally more for parents with higher
motivation.
Proof. It is easy to see that the cross derivative of left hand side of (25) with
respect to θ and 2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA
3
> 2
3
θTH
wTH
− ΩH
3
is positive.
In other words, if immigration costs increase, but at the same time school
quality increases, the selection of immigrants should improve since those that
get discouraged with the higher costs are more likely to be those for whom the
increase in school quality matters less. Although we do not believe that school
21
quality per se is the main reason of emigration for the majority of people who
leave their country, the result nevertheless has an interesting testable implica-
tion: the school performance of immigrant children should be better in coun-
tries with higher immigrations costs and high quality (public) schools. Gibson
and McKenzie (2011) provide some evidence for this prediction: they show
that the quality of Australian schools is a key pull factor for the most quali-
fied immigrants arriving from New Zealand, Tonga and New Guinea Papua.
4 The school performance of immigrant and
native children
Our model reveals that the effect of the immigration on the school system
depends on the type of parents that immigrate. It can therefore guide us to
understand empirical observations on immigrant school performance and their
effects on native performance.
In empirical studies, student outcomes constitute a typical empirical mea-
sure of school quality. Since these outcomes depend on children’s learning
effort we now examine this effort in more detail. It is clear from equation (13)
that among children in the same school it is their parents’ characteristics ψi,
namely the relative parental concern - the net payoff from parental investment
- , that determines who has the higher learning effort. If we apply this to the
difference in learning effort between an immigrant child and a native child,
then
eIi − eNj =
(
ψIi − ψNj
)
(wcs − wcu)
which implies that the effort of immigrant children is greater than of natives on
average if and only if ΩI > ΩK . Having established this, the next proposition
follows immediately:
Proposition 8 The children of immigrants exert more effort at a given school
than natives if and only if the average relative parental concern is higher among
immigrant parents than natives.22
Therefore, immigrant children performing below average is a sign that im-
migration policies do not select on average the most motivated parents. Sim-
ilarly, we can conclude that a highly performing immigrant child will have
22While Proposition 8 is stated for the school level, it generally holds when the environ-
ment of immigrants and natives are the same. In a country as a whole it would hold if all
schools are the same and immigrants and natives are equally distributed among schools.
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highly motivated parents. Indeed, Proposition 2 reveals that a higher parental
motivation always translates into a better performing child via a higher ed-
ucation effort. From Proposition 1 we know that school involvement only
increases in parental motivation of parents whose wage is not too low, in par-
ticular for parents where wp > w
T
2k
. Schools will still set incentive schemes for
their students when this condition is violated for some parents but is satisfied
for a sufficient amount of parents (technically, condition (16) holds). Highly
motivated parents with too low wages in these types of schools have a negative
effect on school involvement, but the direct effect of rising parental involve-
ment on student effort offsets this negative impact on the school. Hence, the
greater learning effort of children from highly motivated parents must come
because of the parents’ higher demands. The empirical evidence of pushy im-
migrant parents is vast in the case of immigration to the US. As shown by
Glick and White (2004) and Hao and Bonstead-Bruns (1998), immigrant par-
ents are associated with greater demands on their children in terms of school
engagement and academic achievement. Keller and Tillman (2008) find that
both parental and self-reported expectations have significant direct effects on
college attendance. Goyette and Xie (1999) provide evidence that in the US
the behaviors and expectations of Asian immigrant parents’ tend to raise their
children’s school attendance above the average.
The net parental concern ψ
i
= θi
wpi
, also plays an important role in explain-
ing the variation in school performance of native children due to immigration.
Observe that we can rewrite the child’s effort (17) as
ei = (w
c
s − wcu)ψi +
1
2
cT . (26)
This expression allows us to analyze how immigration affects the perfor-
mance of native pupils. For a given school, the relative effect of immigration
on native children varies with the net parental concern. A change in cT sim-
ply shifts the initial effort up (if immigrant parents are better on average) or
down (otherwise),and therefore the relative change in effort is lower the higher
the pre immigration effort level or equivalently, for children associated with a
higher ψi. In other words, the performance of disadvantaged children (low ψi
parents) is more affected by immigration than that of their more advantaged
classmates (high ψi parents). The evidence for this effect is considerable. Fo-
cusing on the mass migration wave from the former Soviet Union to Israel in
the early 1990s, Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2009) find a negative effect of
immigrants on native outcomes which is larger for natives from a more disad-
vantaged social background. Similarly, Betts (1998) shows that immigration
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reduces the probability of completing high-schools for American-native mi-
norities (Blacks and Hispanics). No negative effect of immigrants is found
for non-minority groups. Finally Brunello and Rocco (2011) study whether a
higher share of immigrant pupils affects the school performance of natives us-
ing aggregate multi-country data from PISA. They find evidence of a negative
and statistically significant relationship but the size of the estimated effect
is small and it is bigger for natives with a relatively disadvantaged parental
background.23
Expression (26) also allows us to examine the effect of schools on immi-
grant performance. A typical measure of school quality is the pre-immigration
performance or general performance of its native pupils. As discussed above,
overall native performance is partly driven by cT . According to (26), a higher
level of cT would benefit all children at the school, and hence this would include
the immigrant children. This is consistent with the vast evidence suggesting
that better schools benefit immigrants (Dronkers and Fleischmann, 2010). The
“Operation Solomon”provides a natural experiment for this result. This refers
to the exodus of 15,000 Ethiopian immigrants, who were airborne to Israel
within 36 hours in May 1991. Importantly, they were randomly sorted across
the country. According to our model the average performance of those im-
migrants who were randomly placed into better schools should be higher. As
shown by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004), this was exactly the case: those
Ethiopians who were assigned to better elementary schools24 had better results
in high school.
5 The effect of immigrant skill composition
Parental net concern reflects both parental skills which determine parental
wages and pure parental motivation. This section disentangles the two param-
eters and serves to illustrate how different skill compositions effect the school
system of the immigration receiving country and why. We first reformulate our
results when schools’s involvement in providing incentives is positive (equation
(16)) and how it varies with parental motivation (Proposition 1) in a world
where parents can have skilled and unskilled jobs.
23Similarly, Ohinata and van Ours (2011) find no evidence of negative spillovers of immi-
grants on native Dutch children. They do find however that the share of immigrants in a
classroom is negatively associated with the reading scores of immigrant children.
24The measure of better elementary schools used by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004)
was the average standardized maths scores before Ethiopian entered or other environmental
measures such as welfare rate and average high school matriculation rate.
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Lemma 3 In a school with NU unskilled and NS skilled parents with cor-
responding wages wpu and w
p
s = αw
p
u, where α > 1, the school will choose a
positive learning involvement if
wps = αw
p
u >
wT
2k
(27)
and
wpu >
(β + α)wT
2 (1 + β) kα
(28)
where β =
∑NS
i=1 θi/
∑NU
i=1 θi.
The school’s learning involvement always increases in the parental motiva-
tion of skilled parents. If
wpu >
wT
2k
(29)
school involvement also increases in parental motivation of unskilled parents.
However, if (29) fails then school involvement decreases in the parental moti-
vation of unskilled parents.
Lemma 3 reveals that if unskilled wages are too low relative to the exoge-
nous opportunity cost of schools to incentivize children (Condition (29) fails)
then increasing parental motivation among unskilled parents will reduce school
quality. In this case, positive school incentives require a sufficiently high skill
premium captured by the parameter α. A higher α relaxes both conditions
(27) and (28) and hence favors school involvement in incentivizing students.
The parameter β compares total parental motivation of skilled parents with
total parental motivation of unskilled parents and β > 1 if the former is big-
ger than the latter. A higher β relaxes (28). The skilled group is sufficiently
motivated so that the resulting positive effect on school incentive outweighs a
potential negative effect of the unskilled parental group due to the violation
of condition (29).
In the case where highly motivated unskilled parents have a negative ef-
fect on the school involvement and therefore impose a negative externality to
the remaining parents it is important to distinguish parental skill from pure
parental motivation. The need for this distinction becomes even more cru-
cial when immigration changes classroom composition. To see why assume
that (29) holds, which is likely in developed countries which are targeted by
immigration since these countries typically have a reasonable exogenous level
of school quality (2k/wT ). In other words keeping the skill level constant an
increase in pure parental concern is always beneficial for school involvement in
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providing incentives. However, things might look very different if immigration
changes the skill composition at school.25 In a world with skilled and unskilled
workers school incentives can also be rewritten as
cT =
2 (wcs − wcu)
3 (NU +NS)
((
2k
wT
− 1
wpu
)
NUθU +
(
2k
wT
− 1
αwpu
)
NSθS
)
. (30)
This expression allows us to disentangle the effect of only high skill and only
low skill immigrations assuming a constant classroom size. If immigrants are
positively selected according to parental motivation and are only high-skilled
workers matched to high-skilled jobs, the effect on native student’s effort is
positive (since the weight given to
(
2k
wT
− 1
wpu
)
is likely to be reduced and
the weight given to the bigger term
(
2k
wT
− 1
αwpu
)
is likely to be increased). If,
however, immigrants are all positively selected but unskilled, then selection
has to be extremely restrictive in the sense that only immigrants with the
highest motivation are admitted for the overall effect on school incentives to
be positive. Similarly, a negative selection of only unskilled immigrants will
always affect natives negatively, while a negative selection of skilled immigrants
has to be extremely negative to have the same effect.
A corollary of the previous point is that the selection of immigrants can
have important implications on school segregation. If the selection of immi-
grants is negative, or even if positive, it involves mainly unskilled workers, this
can easily lead to a flight from some schools into others. In many countries this
implies a flight to the private schools sector. Indeed, Betts and Fairlie (2003)
find that American native students fly toward private secondary schools in re-
sponse to the influx of immigrants into public institutions. Similar results are
found by Cascio and Lewis (2012) who show that school districts in Califor-
nia with larger increases in low-English Hispanic enrollment are those which
exhibited greater relative reductions in the rate of settlement of non-Hispanic
children between 1970-2000. Also, Berniell (2010) discussing the massive re-
cent flow of immigrants into Spain shows that “in 1998-99, when the fraction
of immigrants in Madrid was only 2.6%, about 59% of natives were attending
public schools, while one decade later -when immigrants comprised 17% of to-
tal population roughly 50% of natives chose public institutions. On the other
hand, in 1998-99 only 68% of immigrant parents were choosing public schools,
while in 2008-09 this number raised to 77%.” Farre, Ortega, and Tanaka (2011)
25If schools are segregated by the skill level of parents, i.e. children of unskilled workers are
schooled together and so are children of skilled workers, or if immigration does not change
the classroom composition of children with skilled versus unskilled parents then the natives
always benefit if immigrants have a high parental motivation, and they suffer otherwise.
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also discuss this phenomenon for the Spanish case, and provide a calibrated
model where immigration is indeed the driving force for this sorting.
6 The effect of immigration on school resources
In this section, we allow school resources to be endogenous. Let us denote by
r the amount of resources an administration gives to a particular school. This
could be thought of as class size (or teacher-student ratio) as well as other
resources, such as support to teaching staff, computers and other means of
making the provision of incentives easier for teachers. More resource reduce
the teacher’s time cost of providing incentives, which we model by dividing this
time cost by the amount of resources r. We assume r is the same for all schools
and it is announced by the policymaker before parents and headmasters decide
on the level of incentives taking r as given. Given r the utility of a headmaster
is now:
UT =
θT
N
N∑
i=1
(wcsei + (1− ei)wcu) +
(
TT − 1
2rN
N∑
i=1
eicT
)
wT . (31)
Following the previous analysis, we can obtain the equilibrium values of
the key variables of the school system:
Lemma 4 The optimal strength of the incentives set by parents are given by
cjpl = (w
c
s − wcu)
(
ψjl −
2
3
rθT
wT
+
NIΩI +NNΩN
3(NN +NI)
)
for j = N, I. (32)
while the optimal school incentives are
cAT =
2
3
(wcs − wcu)
(
2rθT
wT
− NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
. (33)
The learning effort of an immigrant child and a native child given by (6) are
therefore
eji = (w
c
s − wcu)
(
ψjl +
2
3
rθT
wT
− NIΩI +NNΩN
3(NN +NI)
)
for j = N, I (34)
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
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Now we introduce the utility of the policymaker who decides the level of
resources for the schools. The policymaker maximizes the complete utility of
the (median-voter) parent (denoted by P¯i) which requires adding the cost of
the school resources (r). This median-voter is a native (the median of the
natives) given that in most countries first-generation immigrants do not get
the right of vote, or they get it when they are naturalized at which point most
of their children will have already gone (at least partially) through the edu-
cation system.26 The costs of resources r are paid by parents through general
taxation, which parents care about, and are internalized by the policymaker
when deciding r. Resource costs are assumed to be quadratic.27
Thus, we can represent the policymaker’s preferences as,
UPM = UPM −
ρ
2
r2, (35)
where ρ is a constant parameter summarizing the cost of resources. Our for-
mulation assumes that schools are financed out of lump sum taxation and the
government keeps a balanced budget.
Substituting (34) and (32) into (35), and then optimizing UPM over r we
obtain:
r =
(wcs − wcu)2 23 θ
T
wT
(
θiM + w
piM
(
NIΩI+NNΩN
3(NN+NI)
))
ρ− wpiM
(
(wcs − wcu)2
(
2
3
θT
wT
)2)
Note that resources increase in the motivation of the immigrant populations
through two sources. First r is increasing in θT which by assumption 1 depends
on the average motivation of the student parents. Secondly, it also depends
positively on the parental motivation of immigrants through ΩI . Hence, the
parental motivation of immigrants reinforces the effects of immigrants selection
that happen through cT , which we already discussed in section 4. Thus, a
poorly selected immigrant population in terms of parental motivation hits
the native students (and the more motivated immigrants) directly through
26To become a US citizen an immigrant must have been a permanent resident for at least
five years. Becoming a permanent resident also takes a few years, and we are considering
immigrants who already have children at the time they emigrate.
27This can be justified by taking into consideration that the state has monopsony power
in the market for teachers and faces a marginal cost function that increases in the number of
teachers hired. This is so, for example, because to attract one more teacher the monopsonist
has to pay an extra cost, since the marginal potential teacher needs a higher reward to be
attracted to the profession.
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school incentives, and indirectly through a reduction in school resources by
the policymakers.
Several authors have found evidence that bad immigrant selection leads
to a reduction in public spending on schooling. Using a quantitative model
of school choice and voting over public education Coen-Pirani (Forthcoming)
shows that education spending per student in California would have been 24
percent higher in the year 2000 if U.S. immigration had been restricted to
its 1970 level. As in our paper, Coen-Pirani (Forthcoming) abstracts from
illegal immigration and allows only native households to vote. His calibrated
parameters indicate that immigrants in California care relatively less for edu-
cation than natives, hence our model provides an alternative explanation for
his findings. The relationship between resources dedicated to public schools
and immigration is also examined by Dottori and Shen (2008). They provide
cross-country evidence (e.g. a mean-difference test) that countries that ex-
perience negative changes in public expenditure per pupil from 1990 to 2004
(Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set) are those with larger increases in the
low-skilled immigrants’ share of the population (UNESCO data). This finding
is consistent with our model, if low-skilled immigrants are also less concerned
about education on average than high skilled immigrants. Indeed, this nega-
tive correlation disappears when Dottori and Shen (2008) look at changes in
the share of immigrants with tertiary education and lagged changes in public
expenditure per pupil. As we also discussed in section 4, these effects will be
reinforced if, in addition, there is a flight of natives away from public schools
into private ones, as Berniell (2010) documents has happened in Spain recently,
for example. The calibrated model of Farre, Ortega, and Tanaka (2011) also
indicates that immigration in Spain led to a large reduction of about 11 percent
in public spending per student.
There is possibly one more channel for immigrants’ motivation to impact
education. So far, we have assumed that the median voter is the median of the
natives, the only ones who can vote. But suppose that immigrants earn the
right of vote sufficiently early after arrival to the destination country. Then,
poorly selected immigrants would shift the median voter toward an individual
who cares less about education and hence lowers the level of resources even
further. Obviously, the vicious cycle of selection becomes virtuous in case of
positive selection. There is a higher level of cT , a higher level of resources r
and the immigrant effect may be improved by enfranchising the immigrants.
Another important observation is that our assumption on funding resources
implies that immigrants are legal, so they pay taxes. If they are illegal (non-
tax paying) but exogenous in number, we would effectively have a higher level
of ρ, which would entail a lower level of resources. If they were illegal and also
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their number were endogenous, an increase in resources would bring more of
them, and the effect is less easy to compute but similar to having a technology
with more rapidly decreasing returns to extra resources.
7 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we propose a model of endogenous migration and human capi-
tal production. The model allows us to understand the differential selection,
and hence performance, of immigrants from the same country into different
destinations. It can also explain why students from different origins exhibit so
widely different performances in the same host country, even after controlling
for observable characteristics. Finally, we study endogenous reactions of the
school system to the presence of immigrants, and through that channel, the
impact on natives and immigrants alike.
Our model can also be used to inform about the effects of different policies
in terms of the selection of immigrants in parental motivation. For example it
suggests that the naturalization of immigrant children but not of the parents
might be a good idea. Naturalization typically means easier access to better
jobs in the future.28 If only children are naturalized these children but not
parents their will have a higher wage prospective for high-skill jobs. In terms
of our model this increases the range of parameters for which condition (22)
holds and hence favors the selection of highly motivated immigrant parents
and leads to better school performance of immigrant children.29
Our model can also explain the bad school performance of children of guest
workers in Germany who had to immigrate without their family and were
allowed to reunite later on (Dronkers and de Heus, 2010). Immigrants who
have to leave their children behind cannot motivate directly their learning
effort, but they will have to remit money in order to pay someone to do
so.30 Moreover, their children face the same external environment than if their
28Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002) provide evidence that in the U.S. naturalized im-
migrants have a more favorable job distribution and higher wages than non-naturalized
immigrants. Moreover, naturalization leads to further wage growth. It allows entry into
certain jobs that are reserved to nationals only, but also gives advantages in terms of sig-
naling long term commitment and the flexibility to travail. The same results are found by
Steinhardt (2008) for Germany and Fourge`re and Fouge`re and Safi (2008) for France.
29This prediction in consistent with Dronkers and Fleischmann (2010) who study immigra-
tion in 13 EU countries and find that a significant macro-characteristic for the educational
performance of immigrant children is the destination country’s naturalization policy. In par-
ticular, the more generous the naturalization policy, the higher the educational attainment
of immigrant children.
30Remittance by immigrants is often meant to keep their children in school or to pay for
30
parents had stayed at home. Incentivating their children has become harder
but the benefits are the same, leading to a negative selection of immigrants in
terms of parental motivation.31
We can also incorporate cultural concerns into our model by allowing par-
ents to care for the cultural orientation in schools in their new home country.
In other words, immigrant parents might feel culturally alienated and therefore
reduce the value they assign to educating their children abroad. This affects
the strength of their own parental involvement but also how they evaluated
the external environment their children face abroad. The possibility of cul-
tural alienation drives away the most motivated immigrants and may lead to
negative selection.32 This is particularly relevant for Muslim immigration to
a western culture due to the considerable cultural difference and the fact that
many Muslims have strong cultural concerns. The existent empirical evidence
Dronkers (2010) is consistent with this finding. In a cross-country comparison
of language skills using the PISA data, Dronkers (2010) found that pupils from
Islamic countries have a substantial disadvantage in language scores compared
to immigrant pupils from other countries of origin, which cannot be explained
on the basis of individual socioeconomic background, school characteristics or
the education system’s characteristics.33
The fact that school orientation may affect selection implies that flexi-
bility on the school orientation and incorporation of some foreign values at
schools could favor the attraction of more motivated immigrant parents. In-
deed, Dronkers (2010) provides evidence that a higher share of pupils with
an immigrant background in a school hampers educational performance (of
all students), but if these pupils have the same regional origin (Islamic coun-
tries; non-Islamic Asian countries), a higher share of pupils with an immigrant
background at that school promotes educational performance.
In our model, we emphasize parental motivation as a key characteristic to
understand the effects of immigration on human capital formation. Although
clearly unobservable, parental motivation may be correlated with other rele-
vant attributes like work ethic or sociability. Our analysis can be extended to
understand the role of families in improving assimilation of immigrants and
their impact on host societies. It is important to bear in mind that there is
no clear correlation between parental motivation and other observable mea-
a better education by schools.
31A formal analysis can be found in an earlier version of the paper on the authors’ web-
pages.
32A formal analysis can be found in an earlier version of the paper available on the authors’
web-pages.
33As captured by the degree of differentiation in secondary education.
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sures of skill intensity like, for example, years of schooling. In this sense, our
analysis warns against immigration policies aiming exclusively at attracting
immigrants merely on their skills.
The focus of this paper is on the school effects of immigration in the host
country. However, applying our model it is straightforward to understand
the effect on the educational system in the source country. For example, if
immigrants were positively selected and, thus, the most motivated parents
leave their countries, this would imply negative effects on their compatriots
who stay home. In particular, this can lead to lower school incentives in the
source country, and hence to smaller learning efforts of non-emigrant children
under plausible conditions.34 In fact, Antman (2011) finds evidence of the
negative effect of immigration on schooling in the source country. Refocusing
the analysis to the home country is an obvious follow-up of this paper.
We restrict our analysis to the effects of immigration on the school system.
Clearly, immigration involves effects beyond schools; in the health sector, in
the labor market and in many other socially important phenomena. Hence, we
do not provide any specific prediction about the optimal policy mix regarding
the number of immigrants. Nevertheless, our model uncovers important side
and feedback effects, which are generally overlooked in the design and im-
plementation of immigration policy. Notwithstanding the importance of these
side effects, a rigorous evaluation of immigration policies requires a model able
to capture their general equilibrium implications; an avenue we leave for future
research.
Another important extension concerns the interactions between the polit-
ical economy of the host country and education; immigrants, or at least their
children, often eventually achieve political rights35 and could importantly, and
perhaps unexpectedly, affect political outcomes.36
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A Empirical Appendix: Immigrant School Per-
formance and Immigration Costs: Selection
beyond skills
Since the school year 2004-2005, 6th grade students (approximately, 11-12
years old) from all primary schools in the Spanish region of Madrid have been
taking a standardized exam called CDI (Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas
Indispensables).37 Although the focus is on a particular region, the CDI has the
advantage of covering the universe of schools independently on whether they
are public, private or charter. Importantly, the CDI provides very precise
information about the immigrant status of children and their parents.38 If
immigrant, the CDI identifies for each student, the country of origin of the
student and their parents, and the time since arrival to Spain. The case of
Madrid is interesting because of the high proportion of immigrant population
(17 % in 2010), the variety of origins (the 10 top immigration origins explain
70% of total immigration; Romanians are the largest community comprising
20% of the total) and the fact that immigration is a relatively new phenomenon
and most immigrants are first or second generation (immigrants comprised
only a 0.5 % of total population in 1981).39
Table 1 reports the average scores from the different parts of the CDI exam
in 2010 for ten of the most important migratory groups in Madrid. We also
include Mathematics and Language scores. As our model emphasizes the role
of parents in the education process, we consider that the country of origin is
that of the father, independently on where the student was born.
Notice first that immigrants perform on average worse than Spanish stu-
dents. Notice as well that the performance of immigrant students varies con-
siderably across origins. The average score from the different parts of the exam
is lower for those children whose father is a migrant from Ecuador, Bolivia,
Dominican Republic or Morocco compared to those whose father is Romanian,
Polish, Russian or Chinese. Surprisingly, Ecuadorians, Dominicans and Boli-
vians are outperformed by those students whose fathers are Romanian, Polish
or Russian even in the Language test.
The fact that student performance varies across different immigration groups
may be grounded in differences in immigration costs across source countries of
37In English “Indispensable Knowledge and Skills Exam”. More details about the exam
are provided in subsection A.1.
38This information is less precise in other standardized exams such as the PISA.
39This information is provided by the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigracio´n and
the Spanish Statistical Office.
38
Table 1: Mean scores in CDI test for principal migratory groups.
Country of birth of the father Total Language Mathematics
Ecuador 20.00 12.34 7.65
(8.99) (4.85) (5.18)
Romania 22.60 13.34 9.23
(9.35) (4.90) (5.47)
Morocco 18.66 11.09 7.51
(10.15) (5.81) (5.37)
Colombia 21.60 13.00 8.68
(8.99) (4.82) (5.27)
Peru 23.10 13.71 9.41
(8.90) (4.47) (5.43)
Bolivia 20.53 12.59 7.94
(9.15) (4.94) (5.30)
Dominican Republic 16.47 10.36 6.12
(9.58) (5.69) (4.98)
China 20.72 9.57 11.08
(10.71) (6.71) (5.27)
Poland 25.63 14.98 10.69
(8.51) (3.99) (5.47)
Russia 27.54 15.57 12.43
(9.66) (4.17) (6.02)
Average for immigrants 21.88 12.97 8.89
(9.63) (5.16) (5.54)
Average for all students 25.88 14.91 10.95
(8.94) (4.38) (5.46)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis
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immigrants. To test this conjecture, we estimate student scores for immigrant
children using OLS in the following way:
Scoreiks = Immigration Costskα + x
′
iβ + γs + µiks
Immigration Costs is a vector with different proxies for the difficulty of
migrating from origin country k to Madrid. To proxy these costs, we consider
a dummy variable indicating whether k has Spanish as the official language
(Common Languagek); the log of bilateral distance between k and Madrid
(ln(Distance)k);
40, and the share of the migratory group over total immigra-
tion Proportion of Migrantsk). The implicit assumption is that immigration
costs increase with distance, decrease with the share of the migratory group
and are lower if a common language between both countries exists. Finally,
we consider an alternative measure of migratory fixed costs (Fixed − HGk),
proposed by Grogger and Hanson (2011).41 Their estimations of migratory
fixed costs are meant to capture direct monetary cost of migration (as can be
explained by distance) and the monetary value of psychical costs and source
- specific immigration policies imposed by Spain (which can be potentially
associated with the existence of a common language or a large community of
migrants from the source country).42
Other potential determinants of student performance are included in the
vector x′i and explicitly discussed below (subsection A.1. These variables con-
trol for socioeconomic background of students. Finally, γs captures school
fixed effects. As scores may be associated with specific characteristics of the
migratory group and the schools they may concentrate, we cluster errors to
allow within source country groups and within school correlation.
Table 2 reports the main results. We focus on the aggregate scores in 2010
which include those obtained in the mathematics and language parts of the
exam. As we discuss below, our findings are qualitatively similar when we use
the scores in Mathematics and Language separately.
In column (1) we test the performance of the student in the CDI against
CommonLanguagek. The coefficient associated with this variable is both neg-
ative and significant. That is, coming from a Spanish speaking country has
40Bilateral distances are calculated as the distance between the biggest cities from two
countries, weighted for the share of the city in the overall country population. Variables of
distance are obtained from CEPII website: http://www.cepii.fr/.
41Migratory fixed costs estimations by source-destination pair, available online at:
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/research/data/migration-data
42Migratory fixed costs estimated by Grogger and Hanson (2011) are not available for
some relevant source countries as Morocco and Argentina, which have been excluded in this
specification.
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Table 2: Dependent Variable: Standardized Aggregate Score in the CDI exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CommonLanguagek -0.117*** -0.227*** -0.158*** -0.320***
(0.021) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041)
ln(Distance)k 0.081*** 0.066*** 0.132***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Immigrant Sharek -0.806*** -0.294**
(0.136) (0.138)
Ln(GDPpc2010)k 0.087***
(0.013)
Arrival Agei -0.016***
(0.005)
CommonLang ∗ArrAgeik 0.003
(0.006)
MotherEduc− Univi 0.269***
(0.034)
MotherEduc−HigherSecondaryi 0.221***
(0.031)
MotherEduc− V ocationalTrainingi 0.283***
(0.041)
MotherEduc− LowerSecondaryi 0.226***
(0.033)
Livesm1bsi 0.206***
(0.052)
Livesmmore1bsi 0.152**
(0.062)
Livesmfi 0.170***
(0.039)
Livesmfbsi 0.338***
(0.036)
Livesmfmore1bsi 0.263***
(0.037)
OtherSituationsi 0.204***
(0.037)
HighestParentalOcup.−Bus, etc.i -0.018
(0.035)
HighestParentalOcup.− Prof.i 0.194***
(0.027)
Agei -0.576***
(0.023) )
Malei 0.026
(0.019)
Kindergarten3− 5i 0.009
(0.021)
SchoolatSixi -0.219***
(0.047)
SchoolatSeven+i -0.533***
(0.058)
Constant -0.362*** -0.983*** -0.820*** 4.651***
(0.015) (0.153) (0.155) (0.363)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,755 11,755 11,755 10,037
R-squared 0.269 0.270 0.273 0.414
Robust standard errors clustered by school and source country in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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a negative effect on student performance. The specification in column (2)
includes ln(Distance)k. Arguably, a larger distance from Madrid is likely to
involve higher migration costs, which could give place to a selection of more
motivated parents. This variable appears as positive and significant in column
(2). This suggests that once we control for Common Language, a larger dis-
tance of immigration improves the immigrant children’s performance. Another
possible source of lower immigration costs is the existence of an important net-
work of migrants located in Spain. For this reason, specification (3) includes
Proportion of Migrantsk. The coefficient for this variable is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that a more important network of migrants is associated
with a reduction in the school performance of children.
Column (4) includes other potential determinants of student performance
in the CDI test. A main concern is that the variables considered as proxies of
immigration costs may be correlated with the per capita income of the country
of origin. For this reason, we include the logarithm of per capita income at
current dollars in 2010 of the source country (ln(GDPpc2010)k)
43. While this
variable is positive and significant, the effect of our immigration costs variables
remain qualitatively unchanged.
To control for socioeconomic and cultural status, we use additional controls
following Anghel and Cabrales (2014). These controls include the child’s ar-
rival age to Spain (Arrival Age i), variables capturing the mother’s education
level, the highest parental occupation, the family composition, the age and
sex of the student and the age when the child started formal education.44 The
effects of these control variables are as expected and consistent with Anghel
and Cabrales (2014) to whom we remit for a specific discussion. The impor-
tant point to highlight is that once the additional controls are included, our
variables of interests which capture immigration costs preserve the signs and
significance. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients are even higher.
Results in column (4) are quantitatively relevant. Sharing the official lan-
guage reduces the score of the students in 0.32 standard deviations (2.9 points
in the exam, which represents a marginal effect of 11%). Taking two coun-
tries, as Ecuador and Poland, this variable explain, ceteris paribus, half of
the difference in the average CDI score between these countries. As to dis-
tance, an increase of 1% in distance increases in 0.0013 standard deviations
the score in the exam. In the case of two countries as Poland and Morocco,
this is equivalent to a difference of 1.3 points, explaining 19 % of the difference
43Per Capita GDP at current dollars comes from the World Development Indicators
database
44For a more detailed description of these variables see subsection A.1.
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in the average score of those countries. The variable Immigrant Sharek has
a negative impact on the exam, at 1% significance level. An increase in 1
percentage point in the share of migrants negatively affects in 0.003 standard
deviations the aggregate score. As for the case of Ecuador and Romania (with
a proportion of migrants of 22.7% and 10.3% respectively), this predicts that
Ecuadorians will obtain, on average, 0.34 points less in the CDI exam, when
all other variables remain constant. Considering the difference in the average
scores in Table 1, this result explains 13% of the existing difference between
both countries.
Finally, we turn to using the direct measure of immigration costs proposed
by Grogger and Hanson (2011) (Fixed−HGk). In the regressions reported in
table 3 we replace our migration cost variables by Fixed−HGk. Column (1)
includes the same controls than those we used in the estimation displayed in
the column (4) of table 2. Columns (2) and (3) replicate the same regression
in column (1) but for Mathematics and Language separately. Column (4)
excludes those countries with a similar level of development than Spain. Again,
the results show a clear positive relationship between migration costs and
student performance.
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Table 3: Dependent Variable: Standardized Score in the CDI exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Aggregate Language Mathematics Aggregate
Fixed−HGk 0.004*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDPpc2010)k 0.093*** 0.070*** 0.099*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024)
Arrival Agei 0.000 -0.017*** 0.014*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CommonLang ∗ArrAgeik -0.022*** -0.009 -0.028*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
MotherEduc− Univi 0.262*** 0.271*** 0.207*** 0.254***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.036) (0.041)
MotherEduc−HigherSecondaryi 0.221*** 0.265*** 0.144*** 0.234***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.034) (0.037)
MotherEduc− V ocationalTrainingi 0.230*** 0.316*** 0.113*** 0.246***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.044) (0.049)
MotherEduc− LowerSecondaryi 0.217*** 0.256*** 0.153*** 0.236***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.036) (0.040)
Livesm1bsi 0.203*** 0.193*** 0.184*** 0.197***
(0.056) (0.063) (0.054) (0.062)
Livesmmore1bsi 0.127* 0.104 0.151** 0.144*
(0.070) (0.083) (0.065) (0.074)
Livesmfi 0.179*** 0.145*** 0.174*** 0.179***
(0.042) (0.047) (0.040) (0.045)
Livesmfbsi 0.346*** 0.291*** 0.329*** 0.355***
(0.039) (0.044) (0.037) (0.042)
Livesmfmore1bsi 0.268*** 0.206*** 0.274*** 0.264***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.039) (0.043)
OtherSituationsi 0.226*** 0.157*** 0.237*** 0.233***
(0.040) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042)
HighestParentalOcup.−Bus, etc.i -0.026 0.012 -0.041 -0.021
(0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.047)
HighestParentalOcup.− Prof.i 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.158*** 0.184***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
Agei -0.572*** -0.611*** -0.443*** -0.569***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026)
Malei 0.035* -0.153*** 0.178*** 0.035
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
Kindergarden3− 5i 0.011 0.026 -0.001 0.009
(0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
SchoolatSixi -0.178*** -0.102* -0.195*** -0.178***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.050) (0.054)
SchoolatSeven+i -0.516*** -0.512*** -0.418*** -0.514***
(0.065) (0.077) (0.059) (0.067)
Constant 5.293*** 6.258*** 3.572*** 5.326***
(0.339) (0.385) (0.316) (0.381)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,468 8,646 8,565 7,544
R-squared 0.420 0.374 0.391 0.403
Robust standard errors clustered by school and source country in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As additional robustness exercises, we report the same regressions for a
different sample where we exclude countries with similar level of development
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than Spain.45 As shown below, our findings are robust to this re-sampling.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating similar specifications to those dis-
played in columns (4) and (5) of table 2 for the scores obtained in Mathematics
and Language. Results are qualitatively similar than what we obtain for the
aggregate score.
In table 5 we show the results of re-estimating the regressions reported in
table 2 but after excluding those countries with similar level of development
than Spain. Clearly, our results hold after this re-sampling.
45These are: Germany, Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, United States, United King-
dom, France, Netherlands, Israel, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Australia, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Japan and Luxembourg.
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Table 4: Dependent Variable: Standardized Score in the CDI exam - Mathe-
matics and Language
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mathematics Language
CommonLanguagek -0.373*** -0.192***
(0.040) (0.047)
ln(Distance)k 0.172*** 0.059**
(0.019) (0.023)
Immigrant Sharek -0.369*** -0.194
(0.131) (0.152)
Ln(GDPpc2010)k 0.078*** 0.082***
(0.014) (0.014)
Arrival Agei 0.000 -0.034***
(0.005) (0.005)
CommonLang ∗ArrAgeik -0.007 0.016**
(0.005) (0.006)
MotherEduc− Univi 0.211*** 0.282***
(0.032) (0.038)
MotherEduc−HigherSecondaryi 0.135*** 0.276***
(0.030) (0.036)
MotherEduc− V ocationalTrainingi 0.158*** 0.365***
(0.040) (0.046)
MotherEduc− LowerSecondaryi 0.150*** 0.275***
(0.031) (0.037)
Livesm1bsi 0.191*** 0.188***
(0.051) (0.058)
Livesmmore1bsi 0.161*** 0.140*
(0.058) (0.074)
Livesmfi 0.167*** 0.135***
(0.037) (0.043)
Livesmfbsi 0.323*** 0.281***
(0.034) (0.041)
Livesmfmore1bsi 0.274*** 0.194***
(0.035) (0.042)
OtherSituationsi 0.215*** 0.139***
(0.035) (0.042)
HighestParentalOcup.−Bus, etc.i -0.007 -0.013
(0.034) (0.038)
HighestParentalOcup.− Prof.i 0.172*** 0.181***
(0.028) (0.028)
Agei -0.451*** -0.608***
(0.020) (0.026)
Malei 0.175*** -0.168***
(0.019) (0.021)
Kindergarden3− 5i -0.004 0.026
(0.021) (0.023)
SchoolatSixi -0.209*** -0.174***
(0.045) (0.052)
SchoolatSeven+i -0.402*** -0.576***
(0.052) (0.071)
Constant 2.899*** 5.777***
(0.338) (0.418)
School FE Yes Yes
Observations 10,143 10,242
R-squared 0.378 0.371
Robust standard errors clustered by school and source country in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Dependent Variable: Standardized Aggregate Score in the CDI exam
- excludes countries with similar level of development than Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CommonLanguagek -0.055** -0.233*** -0.183*** -0.382***
(0.023) (0.038) (0.040) (0.045)
ln(Distance)k 0.143*** 0.127*** 0.153***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Immigrant Sharek -0.555*** -0.235*
(0.139) (0.141)
Ln(GDPpc2010)k 0.124***
(0.020)
Arrival Agei -0.021***
(0.005)
CommonLang ∗ArrAgeik 0.008
(0.006)
MotherEduc− Univi 0.255***
(0.035)
MotherEduc−HigherSecondaryi 0.222***
(0.032)
MotherEduc− V ocationalTrainingi 0.291***
(0.044)
MotherEduc− LowerSecondaryi 0.236***
(0.034)
Livesm1bsi 0.196***
(0.056)
Livesmmore1bsi 0.173***
(0.065)
Livesmfi 0.167***
(0.041)
Livesmfbsi 0.342***
(0.039)
Livesmfmore1bsi 0.267***
(0.039)
OtherSituationsi 0.209***
(0.039)
HighestParentalOcup.−Bus, etc.i -0.012
(0.040)
HighestParentalOcup.− Prof.i 0.196***
(0.029)
Agei -0.576***
(0.023)
Malei 0.025
(0.021)
Kindergarden3− 5i 0.003
(0.023)
SchoolatSixi -0.219***
(0.048)
SchoolatSeven+i -0.530***
(0.059)
Constant -0.452*** -1.565*** -1.404*** 4.178***
(0.018) (0.179) (0.183) (0.394)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,734 10,734 10,734 9,112
R-squared 0.256 0.260 0.261 0.403
Robust standard errors clustered by school and source country in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.1 Additional Information About the CDI
The Spanish educational system is composed of 6 years of primary school, 4
years of compulsory secondary education (E.S.O.) and 2 years of non-compulsory
education, which is divided into vocational training and preparation for college
(bachillerato). There are also three years of free publicly funded pre-school,
from ages 3 to 5. The pre-school children share the premises with those in
primary school.
6th grade primary students in the Madrid region have been taking the
CDI exam (Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables) since the
academic year 2004-2005.46 Like the OECD’s PISA exam, the CDI exam does
not have any academic consequences for the student, it is only intended to
give additional information to teachers, parents and students.
The CDI exam consists of two parts of 45 minutes each: the first part
includes tests of Dictation, Reading, Language and General Knowledge and
the second part is composed of mathematics exercises. We use as a measure of
student achievement the exam scores, standardized to the yearly mean, in the
Total Exam, in Language (including dictation, reading, language and general
knowledge) and Mathematics. The exams are conducted in Spanish for all
students, whether or not they were in a bilingual school.
Before taking the exam, a short questionnaire is filled out by each student.
In the questionnaire the students are asked a few questions about themselves,
their parents and the environment in which they are living. The answers to
these questions provide rich information on individual characteristics of stu-
dents: from the questionnaire we obtain the country of birth of the student, the
country of birth of the parents, the level of education of the parents, the occu-
pation of the parents, the composition of the household in which the students
lives and the age at which the student started to go to school/kindergarten.
From the exam we have information at student level on age (Age i) and gender
(which we include as a dummy variable Male i which takes the value 1 if the
student is male).
Children can start formal schooling before the age of 3 with nursery (our
base category in the regressions), or between 3 and 5 with kindergarten (Kindergarden3-
5 i) or only with primary school at the age of 6 (SchoolatSix i) or 7 (Schoolat-
Seven i).
Regarding the education of the parents, students were asked to provide this
information for both the mother and the father. In the regressions, we con-
trol by the educational level of the mother of the student (MotherEduc). We
46From the school year 2009/10, the exam is also administered to all students in the third
grade of compulsory secondary education (14-15 years old).
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distinguish the following categories: university education (MotherEduc Univ i),
higher secondary education (MotherEduc HigherSecondary i), vocational train-
ing (MotherEduc VocationalTraining i), lower secondary education (MotherE-
duc LowerSecondary i) and no compulsory education which serves as our base
category. In the case of the occupation of the parents, we choose the highest
level of occupation between them. Thus, we differentiate between the follow-
ing categories: professional occupations (HighestParentalOcup Prof i), for ex-
ample teacher, researcher, doctor, engineer, lawyer, psychologist, artist, etc. ;
business and administrative occupations (HighestParentalOcup Business,etci),
for example CEO, civil servant, etc.; and blue collar occupations (for example
shop assistant, fireman, construction worker, cleaning staff, etc.) which is our
base category.
The variable on the composition of the household of the student comes
from the answers to the question: “With whom do you usually live?”. We
differentiate the following seven categories: lives only with the mother (our
base category), lives with the mother and one sibling (Livesm1bs i), lives with
the mother and more than one sibling (Livesmmore1bs i), lives with the mother
and the father (Livesmf i), lives with the mother and the father and one sibling
(Livesmf1bs i), lives with the mother and the father and more than one sibling
(Livesmfmore1bs i) and other situations (OtherSituations i).
B Theoretical Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Using the notation introduced in (9) and (10), the optimal level of incentives
of native and immigrant parents (8) can be written as
cNpi = ψ
N
i (w
c
s − wcu)−
1
2
(
θT
wT
(wcs − wcu)−
NNcNp +NIc
I
p
2N
)
. (36)
cIpi = ψ
I
l (w
c
s − wcu)−
1
2
(
θT
wT
(wcs − wcu)−
NNcNp +NIc
I
p
2N
)
. (37)
The average parental incentives of immigrants and natives can therefore be
written as
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Notice as well that cIp =
(
ΩI − ΩN
)
(wcs − wcu)+cNp . Using this and simplifying,
cNp and c
I
p become:
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and therefore:
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3
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(
2
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NIΩI +NNΩN
)− (NN +NI)θT
wT
)
. (42)
Plugging (42) into (36), (37) and 7) we then get the desired result.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let I+ (Fξ) = {i ∈ N |ξi = ξ, Fi < Fξ} , and I− (Fξ) = {i ∈ N |ξi = ξ, Fi ≥ Fξ}.
Denote by N+ (Fξ) the cardinality of I+ (Fξ) and by N− (Fξ) the cardinality
of I− (Fξ) Then, under a threshold equilibrium, we can write for any vector of
thresholds F = (Fξ)ξ∈Ξ ,
ΩI (F ) =
∑
i∈I+(Fξ)
θi
wpi∑
ξ∈Ξ N+ (Fξ)
, ΩH (F ) =
∑
i∈I−(Fξ)
θi
wpi∑
ξ∈Ξ N− (Fξ)
.
Clearly
ΩA (F ) =
N+ (F ) ΩI (F ) +NNΩN
(NN +N+ (F ))
.
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Let for any i with ξi = ξ ∈ Ξ
Gξ (F ) ≡ max
{
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(43)
+
θ2i
2
((
wcsA − wcuA
)2
wpiA
−
(
wcsH − wcuH
)2
wpiH
)
+θi
((
wcsA − wcuA
)2(2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA(F )
3
)
− (wcsH − wcuH)2(23 θTHwTH − ΩH(F )3
))
+
1
2
(
wpiA
(
2
3
θTA
wTA
− ΩA(F )
3
)2 (
wcsA − wcuA
)2 − wpiH (23 θTHwTH − ΩH(F )3
)2 (
wcsH − wcuH
)2)}
Under these conditions existence is guaranteed by a straightforward appli-
cation of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, since G (.) is a continuous function
and we have defined F to belong to the convex, compact set [0, A]|Ξ| and G (.)
also maps into [0, A]|Ξ| by the assumption that A > maxξi∈Ξ UPi . 
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Under the assumption that ∂ΩNA
∂θξ
= ∂ΩH
∂θξ
= 0 and we only look at individuals
within the same skill group, i.e. individuals are homogeneous in wages we need
to calculate the derivative of the left-hand side of (21) with respect to parental
motivation and determine its sign. This derivative is given by(
wcuA − wcuH
)
+θi
((
wcsA − wcuA
)2
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−
(
wcsH − wcuH
)2
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)
+
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3
)
− (wcsH − wcuH)2(23 θTHwTH − ΩH(F )3
))
,
Using the link between school and parental motivation the last line can be-
comes
1
3
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)2(2kA
wTA
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so that the derivative can be rewritten as
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It is positive if both lines are positive which gives us conditions (22) and
(23). If both (22) and (23) are violated the derivative is negative. If (22)
is violated and (23) holds, the derivative is positive for sufficiently small θi
and negative for sufficiently high θi. Hence, (21) reaches its maximum for
some intermediate value of θi. Finally, if (22) holds and (23) is violated the
derivative first decreases in θi and then increases in θi. Hence, (21) reaches its
minimum for some intermediate value of θi. 
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Using the first order conditions for children’s effort decision (6) we get:
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So
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, (44)
For parents the only change now is that school resources cost money which
they will have to pay from general taxation, but given the quasi-linearity in
income of utility and that taxation is already decided at the time parents
choose their effort, the amount of those taxes do not affect the parental effort
decision. Hence
cjpi =
θi
wpi
(wcs − wcu)−
1
2
cT for j = N ; I. (45)
Similar calculations as in Lemma 1 yield the desired result.
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